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RESOLUTION OF PRIMARY
RESIDENCY STATUS IN NEW YORK
CITY
The Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1983, commonly re-
ferred to as the Omnibus Housing Act [hereinafter "OHA"],1
conferred authority on "courts of competent jurisdiction ' 2 to de-
l The Emergency Tenant Protection Act, ch. 403, 119831 N.Y. Laws 698, as amended by
ch. 102, 119841 N.Y. Laws 1627 and by ch. 668, [1985] N.Y. Laws 1614 (McKinney) [here-
inafter OHAI. See Sommer v. Lenoir/Hickory Knitting Mills, Inc., 126 Misc. 2d 255, 256,
481 N.Y.S.2d 973, 974 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), affid, 128 Misc. 2d 481, 494
N.Y.S.2d 596 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1985); Elwick Ltd. v. Howard, N.Y.L.J., May 16,
1984, at 6, col. 2 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984), affd, 111 App. Div. 2d 73, 489 N.Y.S.2d
198 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't), affd, 65 N.Y.2d 1006, 484 N.E.2d 664, 494 N.Y.S.2d
301 (1985). The Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1983 amended the Emergency Ten-
ant Protection Act of 1974, the Administrative Code of the City of New York, the Civil
Practice Laws and Rules, the Multiple Dwelling Law, the Real Property Law, the Real
Property Actions and Proceedings Law and other statutes, with respect to, inter alia, resi-
dential tenancies. See Lampeas v. Taylor, 121 Misc. 2d 362, 363, 467 N.Y.S.2d 753, 754
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1983).
2OHA, supra note 1, at § 41 (amending NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YY51-
3.0(a)(1)() (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986); OHA, supra note 1, at § 42 (amending NEW
YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § Y51-3.0(e)(2)(i)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986); OHA,
supra note 1, at § 55 (amending ch. 576, § 5(a)(1 1), [1974] N.Y.Laws). Jurisdiction may be
found in either the Supreme Court of the State of New York, N.Y. CONST. art. 6, § 7, or
the Civil Court of the City of New York, N.Y. CoNsr. art. 6, §§ 1, 15; N.Y. CIrY Civ. Or.
Acr §§ 102, 110 (McKinney 1963 & Supp. 1986). The majority of proceedings are brought
in the landlord-tenant part of the civil court instead of in the supreme court. See Batista,
Primary Residence: The Law the Conflict and the Future, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 11, 1985, at 1, col. 3;
id. at 4, col. 2 (citing Kanter v. E. 62nd St. Assoc., 111 App. Div. 2d 26, 488 N.Y.S.2d 692
(1st Dep't 1985)). Proceedings brought in the civil courts are largely "holdovers" which
arise after the lease expires to regain possession on grounds of non-primary residence; pro-
ceedings brought in the supreme court arise before the lease expires and seek declaratory
judgments regarding renewal of the lease on grounds of non-primary residence. See Batista,
supra, at 4, col. 3. See also Sommer, 126 Misc. 2d at 256, 481 N.Y.S.2d at 974 (civil court
holdover proceeding): Howard, N.Y.L.J., May 16, 1984, at 6, col. 2 (supreme court declara-
tory action): Park S. Assoc. v. Mason, 123 Misc. 2d 750, 751, 474 N.Y.S.2d 672, 673
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County) (summary holdover proceeding), afl'd, 126 Misc. 2d 945,
488 N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984); Wedemeyer, Enforcing Primary-Resi-
dence Rules, N.Y. Times, Sept. 9, 1984, § 8, at 6, col. 2 (general discussion of primary
residence). A declaratory judgment in the supreme court is res judicata in a subsequent
proceeding to recover possession. Sutton Assoc. v. Bush, 125 Misc. 2d 438, 439, 479
N.Y.S.2d 952, 953 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984); see also Kace Realty Co. v. Levy, 127 Misc.
2d 940, 490 N.Y.S.2d 418 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1985) (civil court has no jurisdic-
tion to render a declaratory judgment).
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termine whether rent-controlled 3 and rent-stabilized4 apartments
3 Estimates indicate that approximately 218,000 rent-controlled apartments exist in New
York City. Wilkerson, State Proposes a Revised Code on Rent in City, N.Y. Times, Mar. 7,
1986, at Al, col. 1: id. at B3, col. 4. Rent control is operated and administered wholly bythe government and is designed to restrict rents. M. STEGMAN, THE DYNAMICS OF RENTAL
HOUSINc. IN NEW YORK CITY 21, 24 (1982). Rent control was initially imposed in New York
City by the federal government in 1943 and was continued by the city administration from
1946-1950: New York State assumed administration of New York City's rent control sys-
tem from 1950-1962. See M. STEGMAN, supra, at 21-23. From 1943-1962, rent control was
characterized by freezes and rollbacks in rents; such severe rent constraints were adjudged
historically and constitutionally acceptable due to continued housing shortages related to
wartime conditions. See I.L.F.Y. Co. v. Temporary State Hous. Rent Comm'n, 11 N.Y.2d
259, 265, 183 N.E.2d 220, 222, 228 N.Y.S.2d 814, 817 (1962); Teeval Co. v. Stern, 301
N.Y. 346, 357-59, 93 N.E.2d 884, 889, cert. denied, 340 U.S. 876 (1950).
New York State ceded the responsibility for rent control administration to New York
City's rent control agency in 1962; the City agency later became known as the Department
of Housing Preservation and Development [hereinafter HPDJ. See M. STEGMAN, supra, at
22. One commentator concluded that during the period from 1943-1969, New York City
rent control constrained rents to 36% below their true market level as of 1968. See A.
DOWNS, RENTAL HOUSING IN THE 1980's 36 (1983) (citing 2 1. LOWRY, J. DESALvO, B. WOOD-
FILL, RENTAL HOUSING IN NEW YORK CITY: THE DEMAND FOR SHELTER 87-92 (1971)). The
city administration of rent control by HPD continued until the OHA returned the rent
control system to State administration under the Division of Housing and Community Re-
newal [hereinafter DHCR[. See OHA, supra note 1, at §§ 23-33 (amending NEW YORK, N.Y.
ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § Y51-4.0 (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)); M. STEGMAN, supra, at 25-
27. Generally, when rent-controlled apartments become vacant, they become subject to
rent stabilization. See Wilkerson, supra, at B3, col. 4; see also infra notes 33-35 and accom-
panying text (Emergency Tenant Protection Act changed rent control and stabilization).
These re-characterized apartments permit the landlord to set a "market rate" which the
first tenant may appeal. Wilkerson, supra, at B3, col. 4. For the history of maximum allowa-
ble rental increases in New York City and of rent control administration prior to the OHA,
see M. STEGMAN, supra, at 21-32.
' There are approximately 940,000 rent-stabilized apartments in New York City. Wil-
kerson, supra note 3, at B3, col. 4. In 1965, the housing shortage was reflected in a 3.19%
vacancy rate. 8200 Realty Corp. v. Lindsay, 27 N.Y.2d 124, 136, 261 N.E.2d 647, 653,
313 N.Y.S.2d 733, 742, appeal dismissed, 400 U.S. 962 (1970). In 1968, the vacancy rate
dropped to 1.23%. Id. During this period, rent increases in uncontrolled sectors were aver-
aging 30-60% over pre-existing rents, thereby forcing tenants to leave the city. Id.
Rent stabilization was initiated in New York City in 1969 to moderate "unconscionable"
rents in apartments which were not rent-controlled. See M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 22-
24. Rent stabilization was adopted as a means to halt rent spirals while simultaneously en-
couraging housing construction. 8200 Realty Corp., 27 N.Y.2d at 136, 261 N.E.2d at 654,
313 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43. It was viewed as a compromise to the further imposition of rent
control. See M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 22-24. Whereas rent control was administered
wholly by the government, the rent stabilization system permitted industry self-regulation
with supervision by government and public bodies, thereby furnishing greater freedom to
increase rents within reasonable limits. See id.; 8200 Realty Corp., 27 N.Y.2d at 136-37, 261
N.E.2d at 654, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 742-43.
For a summary of the system of rent stabilization prior to the OHA, see infra notes 5,
33-34 and accompanying text. For a summary of rents under rent stabilization prior to theOHA see M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 21-32. The administration of the rent stabilization
system was transferred from HPD to the DHCR by the OHA. See OHA, supra note 1, at§ 3 (amending ch. 576, § 8(c), [1974] N.Y. Laws; NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51,
Primary Residency Status
may be deregulated when the apartment was not the tenant's pri-
mary residence.' Although the OHA failed to define the term
"primary residence," administrative regulations served as guide-
§ YY51-4.1.1(a)(4) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)).
OHA, supra note 1, at § 41 (amending NEW YORK. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YYSI-
3.0(a)(l)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)): OHA, supra note 1, at § 42 (amending NEW
YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YSI-3.0(e)(2)(i)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)); OHA,
supra note 1, at § 55 (amending ch. 576, § 5(a)(1 1) [1974] N.Y. Laws). Prior to the OHA,
the HPD, see supra note 3, had full responsibility for administration of the rent control
system in New York City. See ch. 21, [19621 N.Y. Laws 53; see also NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 51, § Y51-1.0 et seq. (McKinney 1975). During this time, the landlord of a rent-
controlled apartment sought an order under § 18 of the City Rent and Eviction Regula-
tions to decontrol an accommodation not used as a tenant's primary residence. See [ 1985] 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 2100.18; New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 18(a), N.Y. UNCON-
SOL LAWS (Book 65) (McKinney 1974). Either the landlord or the tenant could seek review
of the determination in an Article 78 proceeding. See Herzog v. Joy, 74 App. Div. 2d 372,
428 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1st Dep't 1980), arid, 53 N.Y.2d 821, 422 N.E.2d 582, 439 N.Y.S.2d 922
(1981): 65 Cent. Park W., Inc. v. Greenwald, 127 Misc. 2d 547, 486 N.Y.S.2d 668 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1985). The New York City Rent and Eviction regulations governing
rent control are now administered by the DHCR, supra note 3. See NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMItN.
ConE ch. 51, § Y51-3.0 (a)&(b) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986).
Before the OHA, the rent stabilization system was under the auspices of three agencies:
(I) "Fhe Rent Guidelines Board. The Board was composed of nine mayoral appointees
who represented tenants, owners and the public. The Board promulgated guidelines for
rent adjustments. NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YYS1-5.0 (McKinney 1975);
(2) The Rent Stabilization Association Inc. of New York City [hereinafter "RSA"]. The
RSA was composed of landlords representing at least 40% of all the stabilized apartments.
The RSA was responsible for promulgating a Code [hereinafter "RSA Code"] which regu-
lated the conduct of landlords consistent with the law. Id. at § YY51-6.0; and
(3) The Conciliation and Appeals Board [hereinafter "C.A.B."]. The C.A.B. was an in-
dependent public agency which enforced the rent regulations and the RSA Code. Id. at
§ YY51-6.0(b); see also M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 24; infra notes 33-34 and accompany-
ing text (effect of the Emergency Tenant Protection Act on rent stabilization system in
New York City). Prior to the OHA, supra note 1, the C.A.B. rulings governing stabilized
apartments were also subject to Article 78 review. See M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 24.
The C.A.B. functions were transferred to the DHCR, supra note 3. See OHA, supra note 1,
at §§ 16, 18-21. Originally, the OHA provided that the RSA retained its power to promul-
gate RSA Code amendments subject to HPD approval. See OHA, supra note 1, at § 9
(amending NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YY5I-6.0 (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)).
The DHCR was recently given the power to write a new RSA Code with the involvement
of HPD. Ch. 888, §§ 2, 3, 119851 N.Y. Laws 2284 (McKinney); see also Wilkerson, supra
note 3, at Al, col. I (Governor Cuomo's administration proposes new amendments to the
RSA Code, drafted by the DHCR).
6 See Greenwald, 127 Misc. 2d at 548, 486 N.Y.S.2d at 668. References to the phrase
"primary residence" occur throughout the OHA. See, e.g., OHA, supra note !, at § 9
(amending NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(b), x(c)(12)(b), (c)(12)(c)
(McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)): OHA, supra note 1, at § 39 (adding N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW
§ 235(0(4) (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1986)); OHA, supra note 1, at § 41 (amending NEW
YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YY51-3.0(a)(1)(f) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)); OHA,
supra note 1, at § 42 (amending and adding NEW YORK. N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § Y51-
3.0(e)(2)(i)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)).
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lineS7 to courts in discerning its meaning and application.,
New York regulations countenanced a finding of primary resi-
dence where the tenant was either domiciled at the accommoda-
tion or, if not domiciled, where the tenant spent an aggregate of
more than one hundred eighty-three days in the preceding calen-
dar year in the rent-regulated accommodation.' In either event, a
7 See The City Record, May 3, 1983, at 1118, col. I (proposed amendments to the
N.Y.C. Rent Stabilization Law, the RSA Code, ch. 576, § 15 [1974] N.Y. Laws 1533, and
the New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations); see also The City Record, June 16,
1983, at 1573, col. 3 (notice of approval by HPD of proposals effective immediately with
minor changes). The approved HPD amendments attempt to define the term "primary
residence." See The City Record, infra note 9 and accompanying text. Regulations adminis-
tered prior to the OHA failed to define the term "primary residence." See [1985] 9
N.Y.C.R.R. § 2100.18 (State Rent Control & Eviction Regulations) [hereinafter Prior State
regulations]; New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations § 18(a), (b), N.Y. UNCONSOL
LAWS (Book 65) (McKinney 1974) (prior City Rent Control Regulations) [hereinafter Prior
City regulationi; New York City Rent Stabilization Law, Code of the Real Estate Industry
Stabilization Ass'n of New York City Inc. § 54E, N.Y. UNCONSOL LAWS (Book 65) (McKin-
ney 1974) (prior City rent-stabilization regulations). The RSA Code, supra note 5, is appli-
cable to rent stabilization. See NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YY5I-6.0 et seq. (Mc-
Kinney 1974). See also S. KATZ, G. ROSENBERG, G. MALONE, R. SACKS & R. CAYER, RENT
STABILIZATION DIGEST: COURT DECISIONS AND CAB. OPINIONS 1969-1982 C-30 (1983) (prior
RSA Code provision) Jhereinafter RSA Digest].
' See, e.g., De Kovessey v. Coronet Properties Co., N.Y.L.J., July 23, 1985, at 11, col. 3
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1985), leave to appeal granted, 68 N.Y.2d 601 (1986); Newport
Apartments Co. v. Schechter, 124 Misc. 2d 760, 477 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct.
Queens County), affd, 127 Misc. 2d 793, 492 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 2d Dep't
1984); Sommer v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 93 App. Div. 2d 481, 462 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1st
Dep't 1983), affd, 61 N.Y.2d 973, 463 N.E.2d 621, 475 N.Y.S.2d 280 (1984).
1 See, e.g., The City Record, June 16, 1983, at 1573, col. 3. This approved amendment
to § 54E(2) of the RSA Code pertains to rent stabilization and is virtually identical to other
approved amendments to regulations pertaining to rent control. See id. Amended RSA
Code § 54E(2) provides:
In making such determination the Conciliation and Appeals Board shall give due
consideration to any facts and circumstances establishing that the housing accommo-
dation is not the tenant's primary residence, including, but not limited to, the fact
that such tenant (i) specified an address other than such housing accommodation as
his place of residence in any tax return, motor vehicle registration, driver's license
or other document filed with a public agency, (ii) gives an address-other than such
housing accommodation as his voting address, or (iii) assigns and/or sublets such
housing accommodation. Provided, however, that the Conciliation and Appeals
Board shall not find that the housing accommodation which is subject to this Code is
the primary residence of the tenant unless the tenant is either domiciled in the City
at the claimed housing accommodation or, if not domiciled in the City, the tenant
spent an aggregate of more than one hundred eighty-three days in the preceding
calendar year in the City at such accommodation . . . and, in either event, provides
proof satisfactory to the Conciliation and Appeals Board that the tenant either filed
a New York City Resident Income Tax Return at the claimed primary residence for
the most recent preceding taxable year for which such return should have been filed
or that the tenant was not legally obligated to file such tax return.
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tenant's failure to file a New York City Resident Income Tax Re-
turn precluded any finding of primary residence.' 0 The pivotal in-
quiry in the regulations was whether the tenant was "domiciled"
at the apartment.11 The regulations, however, do not offer a defi-
nition of the term "domicile." 12
Domicile has been defined as the place a person makes a home
without a present intention of leaving at some particular future
time. s Whereas residence is determined solely by actual physical
presence, the determination of domicile turns upon one's intent.",
This intention is manifested in an individual's physical acts.1 5 One
Id. These amended regulations covering stabilized apartments have not yet appeared in an
amended RSA Code. See RSA Code, supra note 7. The DHCR was given the power to
write a new Rent Stabilization Code with HPD input and comment. Ch. 888, §§ 2, 3,
119851 N.Y. Laws 2284 (McKinney). see also Wilkerson, supra note 3, at Al, col. 1 (DHCR
proposals to RSA Code).
10 The City Record, supra note 9, at 1573, col. 3.
" See id.; see also Prior City regulations, Prior State regulations, RSA Code and RSA
Digest, supra note 7 ("primary residence" undefined in prior administrative guidelines).
2 See The City Record, supra note 9, at 1573, col. 3 ("domicile" undefined).
13 N.Y. SURR. CT. PRoC. Acr § 103, commentary at 19, 21 (McKinney 1967); id. at
§ 103(15) (McKinney 1967 & Supp. 1986) (domicile is "[a] fixed, permanent and principal
home to which a person wherever temporarily located always intends to return"); see also
People v. Renda, 64 Misc. 2d 445, 447, 313 N.Y.S.2d 816, 819 (Dix Town Ct. Schuyler
County 1970) ("Domicil is the place where a person has his true fixed permanent home
and principal establishment, and to which place he has, whenever he is absent, the inten-
tion of returning, and from which he has no present intention of moving"). Courts require
a demonstration of a clear and convincing intent to abandon the old domicile and acquire a
new one. See In re Estate of Bourne, 181 Misc. 238, 246, 41 N.Y.S.2d 336, 343 (Sur. Ct.
Westchester County 1943), aff'd, 293 N.Y. 785, 58 N.E.2d 729 (1944). Motives are imma-
terial in determining whether an accommodation is one's domicile. In re Newcomb's Estate,
192 N.Y. 238, 251, 84 N.E. 950, 954-55 (1908).
14 See Newcomb's Estate, 192 N.Y. at 250-52, 84 N.E. at 954-55; Renda, 64 Misc. 2d at
446-47, 313 N.Y.S.2d at 818-19.
1s In re Estate of Shindell, 60 App. Div. 2d 393, 395, 400 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (1st Dep't
1977), appeal dismissed, 47 N.Y.2d 949, 393 N.E.2d 1043, 419 N.Y.S.2d 971 (1979), aff'd,
55 N.Y.2d 655, 431 N.E.2d 303, 446 N.Y.S.2d 942 (1981); see also In re Will of Lippert, 24
Misc. 2d 81, 82, 207 N.Y.S.2d 546, 548 (Sur. Ct. Suffolk County 1960) (moving to rest
home and taking only personal belongings while leaving furniture in county where dece-
dent previously lived not a change of domicile). Where there is a question as to domicile,
the oral declarations of the parties are often disregarded and courts look rather to their
conduct. McKone v. State Tax Comm'n, 111 App. Div. 2d 1051, 1053, 490 N.Y.S.2d 628,
630 (3d Dep't 1985) (citing Wilkie v. Wilkie, 73 App. Div. 2d 915, 916-17, 423 N.Y.S.2d
249, 251 (2d Dep't 1980)).
165
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 1: 161, 1986
may acquire a domicile through origin,' choice 17 or operation of
law, 18 but a person may only have one domicile at any particular
time." The rationale for distinguishing between domicile and res-
idence was that a change in domicile may affect civil and property
rights, taxability, and descendency.2 0
Thus, the OHA's failure to define primary residence is amelio-
rated through the guidance afforded by these prior administrative
regulations21 and by independent definitions of the term "domi-
cile."22 Since the OHA transferred to the courts the authority to
determine the issue of primary residence, 8 these regulations
served as useful guidelines. The regulations, however, are not
controlling.24 It is submitted, therefore, that courts are free to
"0 See In re Britton's Will, 100 N.Y.S.2d 969, 971 (Sur. Ct. Jefferson County 1950); In re
Sorrentino's Will, 71 N.Y.S.2d 451, 452 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1946), affid, 272 App. Div.
919, 72 N.Y.S.2d 413 (2d Dep't), affd, 297 N.Y. 696, 77 N.E.2d 10 (1947). Domicile of
origin is determined by that of the parents and continues until there is an effective change;
the actual place of birth is immaterial. See In re Estate of Wendel, 144 Misc. 467, 469, 259
N.Y.S. 260, 262-63 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1932).
17 See Newcomb's Estate, 192 N.Y. at 250, 84 N.E. at 954. "Once domicile exists it contin-
ues until not only is there a physical change of residence but additionally the intent to
abandon the old domicile and acquire a new one." In re Estate of Graner, 34 Misc. 2d
1041, 1043, 229 N.Y.S.2d 958, 960 (Sur. Ct. Westchester County 1962). This requires
actual residence in the new location coupled with an intention to make the new location a
fixed and permanent home. Newcomb's Estate, 192 N.Y. at 250, 84 N.E. at 954.
1s In re Will of Webber, 187 Misc. 674, 64 N.Y.S.2d 281 (Sur. Ct. Kings County 1946).
"A domicile by operation of law is that domicile which the law attributes to a person inde-
pendent of his actual residence. It is applicable primarily to infants and incompetents and
persons" who are under disabilities which prevent them from acquiring a domicile of
choice." See id. at 676, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 284.
19 Id. at 675, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 283. The burden of proof of a change in domicile rests
upon the party who alleges the change. J. PRINCE, RICHARDSON ON EVIDENCE § 113 (10th ed.
1973) (citing Newcomb's Estate, 192 N.Y. at 250, 84 N.E. at 954).
" In re Will of Webber, 187 Misc. at 677, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 285.
" See supra note 6 and accompanying text (OHA fails to define primary residence).
' See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text (domicile discussion).
23 See OHA, supra note 1, at § 41 (amending NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51,
§ YY51-3.0(a)(1)(t) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)); OHA, supra note 1, at § 42 (amending
NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § Y51-3.0(e)(2)(i)(10) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986));
OHA, supra note 1, at § 55 (amending ch. 576, § 5(a)(11), [19741 N.Y. Laws 1517).
'U Batista, supra note 2, at 4, col. 3 n.34; see also 2 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREA-
7SE § 7.9, at 47 (2d ed. 1979). Substantive administrative regulations are of two types. Id.
The first type interprets the statute under which an agency operates and are known as
"interpretive" regulations. See id. The second type of regulation goes beyond interpreta-
tion and is limited by the governing statute. Id. These regulations create wholly new sub-
stantive provisions. Id. "Interpretive regulations" have persuasive force; a court is likely to
give them weight but, as a matter of law, is entitled to reach its own interpretation of the
statutory provision. Id. "Legislative regulations" have the force and effect of law. See id.
However the regulations passed by New York City's HPD are characterized, it is submitted
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vary the regulations as necessary to comport with the interests of
justice and proper adjudication.
This article will initially discuss the legislative origin and intent
of the primary residence requirement. Secondly, this article will
illustrate that the inquiry to determine primary residency should
entail, in the first instance, the determination of whether the
apartment was the tenant's domicile. If the apartment is adjudged
a tenant's domicile, it should also be considered the primary resi-
dence. Only after finding that the tenant was a non-domiciliary
should the tenant's physical presence in the accommodation for
one hundred eighty-three days serve as a basis for primary resi-
dency. It will be further submitted that the filing of a New York
City Resident Income Tax Return should be a factor in the domi-
cile determination and should not be conclusive as to the primary
residence inquiry.
I. HISTORY AND LEGISLATIVE INTENT BEHIND
PRIMARY RESIDENCE REQUIREMENTS
A. The Primary Residence Requirement
Primary residence restrictions on rent-regulated apartments ini-
tially arose in 1971." In that year, the New York State Legisla-
ture enacted the Vacancy Decontrol Law26 which provided for de-
control of rent-regulated apartments upon either a turnover in
that the transfer of all primary residence determinations from administrative agencies to
the courts renders the New York City amended administrative regulations merely advisory,
leaving courts free to develop their own definitions.
25 Ch. 373, §§ 1, 2(5) [1971] N.Y. Laws 1164 (amending ch. 274, § 2(2) 11946] N.Y.
Laws 723-24; ch. 21, § 1(5). 119621 N.Y. Laws 53, 55) [hereinafter "Vacancy Decontrol
Law"]; see Parkview Assocs. v. Lalor, 124 Misc. 2d 998, 999, 478 N.Y.S.2d 249, 250
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1984). But see Shapiro v. Dwelling Managers, Inc., 92 App.
Div. 2d 52, 60, 459 N.Y.S.2d 579, 583-84 (1st Dep't 1983) (Milonas, J., concurring). The
Shapiro court indicated that this 1962 law, which delegated authority to New York City for
rent control administration, provided that where a particular housing accommodation was
not occupied by a tenant as a primary residence the appropriate city agency may, upon
application of a landlord, issue an order decontrolling that apartment. Id. It is submitted
that the 1962 law makes no mention whatsoever of primary residence; the 1971 Vacancy
Decontrol Law, supra note 25, amended the 1962 law to so provide. The 1971 Vacancy
Decontrol Law constituted the initial source of authority for subsequent city rent control
and stabilization regulations relating to primary residence. See Cale Dev. Co. v. Conciliation
& Appeals Bd., 94 App. Div. 2d 229, 231-32, 463 N.Y.S.2d 814, 816 (1st Dep't 1983),
afd, 61 N.Y.2d 976, 463 N.E.2d 619, 475 N.Y.S.2d 278 (1984).
26 Chs. 371-374, 119711 N.Y. Laws 1159-67.
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tenancy resulting in vacancy 7 or a determination that the apart-
ment was not the tenant's primary residence .2  The Vacancy De-
control Law was enacted to encourage housing construction and
to alleviate the housing shortage in New York City by creating an
increase in housing stock. 9 The law was also intended to return
under-utilized apartments to the market place 0 and to increase
tax revenues by removing indirect government subsidization of
rent-regulated apartments."
,7 Ch. 371, § 3, [19711 N.Y. Laws 1159, 1160; see also Governor's Memorandum on
Approval of chs. 371-374, N.Y. Laws Uune 1, 1971), reprinted in [1971] N.Y. Laws 2608
(McKinney) [hereinafter "Governor's Memorandum"]. The Vacancy Decontrol Law per-
mitted rents to rise for the first time since 1969 in New York City. M. STEGMAN, supra note
3, at 25.
" Ch. 373, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1164; Memorandum of State Executive Department on ch.
373, reprinted in [1971] N.Y. Laws 2402 (McKinney) [hereinafter "Executive Department
Memorandum"I.
" See Governor's Memorandum, supra note 27, at 2608-09. The Governor's Memoran-
dum stated that the Vacancy Decontrol Law was designed to "attack the ills caused by rent
control" and would help to "[elstablish an atmosphere conducive to the massive construc-
tion of new housing by the private sector." Id. The memorandum noted that investor con-
fidence was a pre-requisite to private sector investment of funds in housing construction
and maintenance, as evidenced by the surge of new building after 1947 when new apart-
ment building construction was exempt from rent contrdls. Id. at 2609. The Governor's
Memorandum stated that "[t]he implicit agreement that post 1947 housing would remain
uncontrolled was breached by the City of New York in 1969, contributing to the severe
decline of new housing starts in the City." Id. This reference is to the rent stabilization
program initiated in New York City in 1969. See M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 21-22 (Con-
gressional enactment of the Federal Housing and Rent Act of 1947 exempted apartment
units built after February of that year from all forms of rent control).
50 See Cale De'. Co., 94 App. Div. 2d at 231, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 816; Governor's Memoran-
dum, supra note 27, at 2609; Executive Department Memorandum, supra note 28, at 2402.
The Governor's Memorandum stated that the intent of the primary residence requirement
was to discourage the use of apartments for convenience or storage. Governor's Memoran-
dum, supra note 27, at 2609. The Executive Department Memorandum indicated that the
primary residence requirements were to "open up many of these apartments to occupancy
of actual residents of the community who were in need of apartments." Executive Depart-
ment Memorandum, supra note 28, at 2402.
"1 See Governor's Memorandum, supra note 27, at 2609. A rent-controlled apartment is
subsidized through reduced real estate taxes. Id. Therefore, deregulation indirectly in-
creases tax revenues. See id. Deregulation also results in increased tax revenues through
either the rise in the landlord's income due to increased rents upon deregulation or upon
payment of residential tax rates by tenants. See Carroll, Rent-Control Tenants Must Pay Resi-
dent Income Tax or Be Evicted, N.Y. Times, Apr. 12, 1983, at Al, col. 3; id. at A21, col. 1
(Statement of New York City Mayor Edward I. Koch) (primary resident amendments gen-
erate more taxes either through tenants shifting their tax status to higher residential rates
or through higher landlord income taxes on higher rents charged); Jennifer Towers Apart-
ments Co. v. Halpern, N.Y.L.J., June 26, 1984, at 7, col. 2 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1984), rev'd on other grounds, N.Y.L.J., Jan. 11, 1985, at 6, col. I (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st
Dep't 1985) (buildings receive tax abatements in exchange for keeping rent stabilized).
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The Vacancy Decontrol Law resulted in unconscionable in-
creases in rent rates and evictions.32 Thus, in 1974, the New York
State Legislature enacted the Emergency Tenant Protection Act
[hereinafter "ETPA"]s which provided that in any regulated
building of six or more units, a vacated apartment would become
stabilized once a market rent was negotiated for the apartment. 4
While the ETPA modified the Vacancy Decontrol Law by restor-
ing previously controlled, presently vacated apartments to rent
3' M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 25 ("Just as steeply rising rents and substantial increases
in evictions immediately preceded the enactment of the rent stabilization law in 1969, a
similar rise in rents among decontrolled and destabilized units led directly to the New York
State Emergency Tenant Protection Act of 1974 (ETPA).").
- Ch. 576, 119741 N.Y. Laws 1510 [hereinafter ETPAJ amended by ch. 81, 11985] N.Y.
Laws 389 (McKinney); ch. 172, 119851 N.Y. Laws 511 (McKinney); and ch. 248, [1985]
N.Y. Laws 586 (McKinney). The rents and rent increases resulting from the Vacancy De-
control Law were labeled as "excessive and unwarranted .... unjust, unreasonable and
oppressive:" the ETPA was intended to "forestall profiteering, speculation and other dis-
ruptive practices" by landlords. Ch. 576, § 2, [1974] N.Y. Laws 1512-13. The ETPA, a
form of local option legislation, became effective in any jurisdiction upon a determination
of an emergency and need to regulate and control residential rents in a locality; such a
determination is based on a continuing public health, safety and welfare rationale. Ch. 576,
§ 3(a), 119741 N.Y. Laws 1513: see 129 E. 56th St. Corp. v. Harrison, 122 Misc. 2d 799,
800, 473 N.Y.S.2d 910, 911 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984). The New York City Coun-
cil declared an emergency pursuant to the ETPA by resolution dated June 20, 1974. Id.
(citing Axelrod v. Starr, 52 App. Div. 2d 232, 234-35, 383 N.Y.S.2d 31, 32 (1st Dep't
1976), affid, 41 N.Y.2d 942, 363 N.E.2d 363, 394 N.Y.S.2d 639 (1977)).
u See M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 25. After the ETPA, the rent control and stabiliza-
tion system in New York City was as follows:
(1) All buildings constructed prior to 1947 whose tenants were in occupancy prior to the
1971 Vacancy Decontrol Law remained subject to rent control. Id. at 27.
(2) All previously controlled and stabilized apartments which were deregulated under the
Vacancy Decontrol Law upon a turnover in tenancy between 1971 and the ETPA in 1974
had rents brought to free market levels and were then stabilized under ETPA. Id.
(3) Stabilized accommodations under the New York City Rent Stabilization Law of 1969
which became vacant for the first time since 1974, or where the tenant was in continuous
occupancy prior to July 1, 1971, remained at their stabilized rates, and the rents were not
brought up to market rent levels under the ETPA. Id.
(4) All buildings with less than six units remained permanently decontrolled upon va-
cancy under ETPA. Id.
(5) Rents in buildings built after the ETPA are completely unregulated unless they re-
ceive real estate tax abatements or exemptions, in which case they are subject to stabiliza-
tion. Id. The ETPA, as implemented in New York City, is an extension of the Rent Stabili-
zation Law which the City initiated in 1969. See Ziess v. Semenov, 126 Misc. 2d 917, 918,
487 N.Y.S.2d 267, 268 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1985) (citing Ch. 576, § 8(c), [19741
N.Y. Laws 1519; NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CoDE ch. 51, § YY51-3.0(b) (McKinney Supp.
1985-1986)). Thus, a non-primary residence action may be brought pursuant to either the
ETPA or the New York City Rent Stabilization Law, depending on when a vacancy arose
in the apartment.
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stabilization,"8 the ETPA did not alter the Vacancy Decontrol
Law's mandate that those apartments not occupied as primary
residences were subject to complete deregulation. 6 Thus, it is
submitted that the public policies behind the Vacancy Decontrol
Law of 197137 continued with respect to non-primary residence
deregulation under the ETPA of 1974.
By 1983, it became evident that tenants were practicing rent
gouging.38 While the city-wide vacancy rate hovered at only two
percent,8 9 the value of rent-regulated apartments encouraged ten-
ants to stockpile them and exact profits from their undertenants."
Concomitantly, cooperative and condominium conversions be-
came widespread and, therefore, vacant apartments became more
valuable. 41 Tenants primarily living elsewhere maintained these
rent-regulated apartments aspiring for an "insider's price"; own-
ers wished to oust such tenants in anticipation of realizing the full
market price of the apartment upon conversion.42 To curtail these
35 See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
"B See ch. 576, §§ 3(a), 5(a)(l 1), [19741 N.Y. Laws 1513, 1517. Section 5(a)(1 1) of the
ETPA provides that, pursuant to § 3(a), no local (New York City) declaration of emergency
regulation of rents could be made with respect to apartments not occupied by a tenant as a
primary residence. Id.
'7 See supra notes 29-31 and accompanying text.
See Schanberg, A New Class of Landlord, N.Y. Times, May 7, 1983, at 23, col. 2.
' See M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 93 (vacancy rate in 1981 rental housing was 2.13%).
The ETPA defines a housing shortage emergency in terms of a 5% vacancy rate. Ch. 576,
§ 3(a), [1974] N.Y. Laws 1513; see also M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 94 (5% vacancy rate in
rent control). When the vacancy rate exceeds this level, the ETPA requires the city to
declare an end to the housing emergency. Ch. 576, §§ 3(a), 4(c), [1974] N.Y. Laws 1513-
14. This 5% vacancy rate is continued in the OHA. See OHA, supra note 1, at § 2.
40 See Hutchins v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 125 Misc. 2d 809, 817-18, 480 N.Y.S.2d
684, 691. (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
The OHA attempts to discourage tenants from profiting by overcharging subletees. See
OHA, supra note 1, at §§ 9, 51 (amending NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 51, § YY5I-
6.0(c)(12)(a)&(e), (c)(14) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986)); Kolbert v. Clayton, 127 Misc. 2d
1036, 1037-38, 487 N.Y.S.2d 995, 996-97 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1985). The OHA
provides treble damages to subtenants who are overcharged by their sublessor; no discre-
tion is left to courts, and lack of willfulness is not a defense to a tenant. Id.
43 Wedemeyer, supra note 2, at 6, col. 1; see also New York Univ. v. Farkas, 121 Misc. 2d
643, 646, 468 N.Y.S.2d 808, 811 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1983) (leasehold consid-
ered a valuable property right, especially in view of cooperative conversion movement in
New York City).
42 Wedemeyer, supra note 2, at 6, col. 1; for illustrative court holdings, see Consol.
Edison Co. v. 10 W. 66th St. Corp., 61 N.Y.2d 341, 462 N.E.2d 67, 474 N.Y.S.2d 267
(1984), superseded by statute as stated in, Elwick Ltd. v. Howard, 11 App. Div. 2d 73, 489
N.Y.S.2d 198 (1st Dep't), afd, 65 N.Y.2d 1006, 484 N.E.2d 664, 494 N.Y.S.2d 301
(1985); Wissner v. 15 W. 72nd St. Assoc., 87 App. Div. 2d 120, 450 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1st
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tenant practices, in 1983, the New York City Department of
Housing Preservation and Development [hereinafter "HPD"]
amended the primary residence regulations. 48 The OHA, passed
that same year, also enacted provisions to discourage these tenant
practices.4 '
B. New York City Regulations
Under the Vacancy Decontrol Law of 1971, the address from
which a tenant voted or filed tax returns constituted relevant evi-
dence of primary residence in rent control cases. 45 The lack of
state legislative guidance led to the adoption of § 18 of the New
York City Rent and Eviction Regulations 4" and § 54 E of the Rent
Stabilization Association Code.' 7 These regulations constituted
the administrative primary residence guidelines in rent control
Dep't), affd, 58 N.Y.2d 645,444 N.E.2d 1003, 453 N.Y.S.2d 539 (1982); Tower 53 Assoc.
v. Bennett, 127 Misc. 2d 666, 667, 487 N.Y.S.2d 299, 300 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County
1985); 58 W. 58th St. Tenant Ass'n v. 58 W. 58th St. Assoc., 126 Misc. 2d 500, 482
N.Y.S.2d 952 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984).
An "illusory tenant" is one who as a business, sublets rent-controlled or stabilized apart-
ments. Hutchins v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., 125 Misc. 2d 809, 811, 480 N.Y.S.2d 684,
691 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984). Landlords have also employed illusory tenants; in this
situation the landlord uses a "strawman" who subleases the apartment. Id. at 813, 480
N.Y.S.2d at 688. Under this arrangement, the strawman charges the subtenant more than
the legal rate and thus ihe landlord, in effect, charges a rent more than that legally permit-
ted under the rent laws. See id. Similarly, in cooperative and conversion cases, landlords
have employees pose as the prime tenant in order to control votes and effectuate a conver-
sion plan. Id. at 813, 480 N.Y.S.2d at 689; cf. Stutt v. Unique Restorations Co., 96 App.
Div. 2d 1039, 466 N.Y.S.2d 446 (2d Dep't 1983) (alleged fraudulent conspiracy by princi-
pals of sponsor and primary tenants to deprive plaintiff of opportunity to purchase shares
and to influence vote in event of cooperative conversion).
3 The City Record, supra note 9, at 1573, col. 3. The legislature intended to prevent
the use of rent-regulated apartments for convenience, occasional use, or storage by amend-
ing these regulations. Id. at 1573, col. 3; id. at 1574, col. 1 (explanatory memoranda); see,
e.g., Cale Deu. Co. 94 App. Div. 2d at 230, 463 N.Y.S.2d at 815 (apartment served as a
"pied-a-terre" and was never occupied as primary residence).
44 OHA, supra note 1, at § 1. The New York State legislature stated that "[s]peculative
and profiteering practices on the part of certain holders of apartment leases, leav[e] many
subtenants without protection and remov[e] many housing accommodations from the nor-
mal open housing market." Id.
45 Executive Department Memorandum, supra note 28, at 2402. The memorandum
stated that "[a]ny facts or circumstances bearing upon the question of residency, such as
the address from which the tenant votes, files his tax returns, etc., would be relevant evi-
dence of primary residence." Id.
4 "See Prior City regulations, supra note 7; Prior State regulations, supra note 7.
47 See RSA Code, supra note 7; see also RSA Digest supra note 7, at C-30 (RSA Code
§ 54E).
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and rent stabilization cases. Under these provisions, factors indi-
cating non-primary residence included: an address different from
the apartment specified on tax returns, motor vehicle registra-
tions, driver's licenses or public documents; and the practice of
subletting or assigning the regulated apartment.4 While neither
§ 18 nor § 54 E mention domicile,' 9 several cases suggest that
prior to the adoption of the OHA, courts employed a domicile
analysis in reviewing administrative decisions.8 0
The 1983 amendments to the New York City Rent and Eviction
Regulations and the RSA Code"1 provided further guidelines to
determine whether an apartment was being used as a primary resi-
dence. 2 If the tenant were domiciled at the accommodation, the
tenant was a primary resident.58 If the tenant were a non-domicili-
ary, the amendments required an aggregate physical presence of
the tenant in the regulated apartment of more than one hundred
eighty-three days in the preceding calendar year. 54 Regardless of
whether the tenant was a domiciliary or a resident, these adminis-
trative provisions asserted that a failure to file a New York City
Resident Income Tax Return at the regulated apartment pre-
cluded any finding of primary residence.8 5 The same factors previ-
"8 See Prior State regulations, supra note 7; Prior City regulations, supra note 7; RSA
Code, supra note 7.
" See Prior State regulations, supra note 7; Prior City regulations, supra note 7; RSA
Code, supra note 7.
go See DeNave v. Joy, N.Y.L.J., Sept. 23, 1981, at 7, col. I (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1981)
("The word 'primary' meanis] first or highest in importance[.] . . ; [tJhe circumstances
applicable to each individual case should be considered in reaching a determination"); Mat-
ter of Nostra Realty Corp. (Joy), N.Y.L.J.,Jan. 16, 1981, at 4, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1981) ("[Tlhe tenant has always indicated an intent to return to his apartment."); Matter
of Magpat Realty Corp. (Joy), N.Y.L.J., June 13, 1975, at 15, col. I (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County
1975) ("[A] consideration as to.. . bona fide change in the use of the premises involves an
inquiry into the tenant's intention ....").
51 See The City Record, supra note 9 (quoting RSA Code amendments which are virtu-
ally identical to amended regulations governing rent control).
:1 See The City Record, supra note 9.
3 Id.
4 Id. A tenant is exempt from the one hundred eighty-three day requirement if in the
Armed Forces or a new occupant. Id.
"' Id. The tenant is exempt from the filing requirement if personal income is below that
required for filing, if there is no requirement to file due to residency in a foreign country,
or due to employment by a foreign government or organization. Id. See also NEW YORK,
N.Y. ADMIN. CODE ch. 46, §§ T46-105.0(a)(1), (2), -151.0 (McKinney 1984 & Supp. 1986);
N.Y. TAx LAW § 601 (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1986); I.R.C. §§ 893, 894 (West Supp.
1982). The amended regulations parallel the city and state tax codes which require a resi-
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ously listed in the Rent and Eviction Regulations and the RSA
Code continued to constitute relevant evidence on the issue of pri-
mary residence.56 The history of the primary residence require-
ment reflects the notable purposes of ensuring actual occupancy,
easing New York's chronic housing shortage and enhancing the
New York City tax base. It is submitted, however, that owners
have used the primary residence regulations to vacate apartments
for either conversions or the complete circumvention of rent reg-
ulation, 7 thereby aggravating an already strained rental housing
dent tax filing for domiciliaries or non-domiciliaries who maintain "a permanent place of
abode" and spend more than 183 days in the City or State. See NEw YORK, N.Y. ADMIN.
CODE ch. 46, § T46-105.0(a)(1), (2) (McKinney 1984); N.Y. TAx LAW § 605(a)(1), (2) (Mc-
Kinney 1975 & Supp. 1986). A "permanent place of abode" is not considered permanent if
maintained only during a temporary stay for the accomplishment of a particular purpose.
[19821 20 N.Y.C.RIR. § 102.2(e). According to Mayor Koch, the failure to file a New York
City Resident Income Tax Return was to be an "irrebuttable presumption" of non-primary
residence. Carroll, supra note 31, at Al, col. 3.
" See supra note 47 and accompanying text (prior factors of primary residence under
regulations).
51 The conversion of apartments to condominium or cooperative ownership depletes the
supply of rental units causing the rental rates to rise in remaining apartments throughout
the neighborhood. Bryant & McGee, Gentrification and the Law: Combatting Urban Displace-
ment, 25 WAsH. UJ. URt. & CONTEMP. L. 43, 62 (1983). In 1983, there were approximately
18,967 conversions under non-eviction plans of which 6,168 were priced at $100,000 or
more. Marcuse, Gentrification Abandonment and Displacement: Connections, Causes and Policy
Responses in New York City, 28 WASH. U.J. URB. & CoNTEMp. L. 195, 215 (1985). In New York
State, a conversion eviction plan is effective if 51% of the tenants execute and deliver writ-
ten agreements to purchase, under a non-eviction plan, purchase agreements must have
been executed and delivered for at least 15% of all dwelling units in the building. N.Y. GEN.
Bus LAW § 352-eeee(1)(b), (c) (McKinney 1984) amended by ch. 293, [1985] N.Y. Laws 684
(McKinney). No plan for conversion will be approved by the Attorney General if there are
an "excessive number of long term vacancies"; "excessive" is defined as either greater than
a 10% vacancy rate or a percentage that is double the normal average vacancy rate for the
building(s) for two years prior to submission of the plan. Id. § 352-eeee(2)(e). It is submit-
ted that the primary residence law may be used to attain the permitted 10% vacancy rate
and enable landlords to "warehouse" vacated apartments to increase the likelihood of
conversion.
Today, once a court judgment of non-primary residence is obtained, the landlord may
enter an agreement with the adjudicated non-primary resident which states that the apart-
ment is not the tenant's primary residence and is therefore exempt from rent control and
stabilization laws. See, e.g., New York Apartment Law Insider, Oct. 1985, at 5, col. 2
(Brownstone Publishers Inc.). This results in an unregulated market rent without the land-
lord having to seek a new tenant. See id.; see also Wald, City Drive on Illicit Tenants Has Yet to
Bear Fruit, N.Y. Times, Oct. 3, 1983, at B6, col. 1; id. at col. 4 (landlords offer separate
leases. outside of rent stabilization and negotiate with non-primary resident tenants). Alter-
natively, once a judgment of non-primary residence is obtained, the landlord may rent to
another non-primary resident at the highest market rate. New York Apartment Law In-
sider, supra, at 5, col. 2. But see Carroll, supra note 31, at A21, col. 2 (landlord prohibited
from permitting non-primary resident tenant to stay even at higher rent; apartment must
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market. It is further submitted that while the primary residence
requirements primarily enhance the New York City tax base, they
have done little to encourage an increase in affordable rental
housing or to ensure actual occupancy by primary residents in
rent-regulated apartments.
II. DOMICILE As A BASIS FOR PRIMARY RESIDENCE
A. Analysis
The New York City regulations are not binding on a court.
58
They do, however, serve as guidelines for application of the
OHA's primary residence rules in determining when an apart-
ment is a primary residence and, therefore, not subject to deregu-
lation.59 Despite the regulations' mandate, it is submitted that
when determining whether an apartment is a primary residence,
the filing of a New York City Resident Income Tax Return should
not be dispositive.
First of all, where the tenant is domiciled at the accommoda-
tion, a prohibition on the finding of primary residence for failure
to file a resident tax return may lead to inequities.60 Secondly,
courts should not be used in the first instance as a means to collect
taxes where other mechanisms are available which do not impinge
upon a necessity of life."' Finally, absent the tax filing require-
ment, the amended regulations recognize that a finding of domi-
be offered to another tenant). It is submitted that since building owners receive tax abate-
ments and exemptions in exchange for maintenance of the rent-regulated apartments, a
landlord who obtains a judgment of non-primary residence and rents to the same tenant or
rents to another non-primary resident should no longer receive the benefits of such tax
laws on that accommodation; to continue to receive such tax benefits, a landlord should be
required to rent the apartment to a primary resident. See, e.g., NEW YORK, N.Y. ADMIN. CODE
ch. 51, § J51-2.5(d)(2)(iii), (iv) (McKinney 1975 & Supp. 1985-1986) (exemption and abate-
ments for improvements); see also id.; § J51-5.0(a)(6) (McKinney Supp. 1985-1986) ("'per-
manent resident' shall mean a person who has resided in eligible real property for six
months or more, or has a lease or other rental agreement for a term of six or more
months.").
" See Batista, supra note 2, at 4, col. 3 n.34; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
" See Batista, supra note 2, at 4, col. 3 n.34; supra note 24 and accompanying text.
", See infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text (Quaranto & Schechter decisions discussed).
01 See Shapiro v. State Tax Comm'n, 50 N.Y.2d 822, 407 N.E.2d 1330, 430 N.Y.S.2d 33
(1980). In Shapiro, the State Tax Commission assessed a deficiency of income tax prior to
Article 78 judicial review of the assessment and prior to a determination of the taxpayer's
domicile. Id. at 824, 407 N.E.2d at 1331, 430 N.Y.S.2d at 34.
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cile status qualifies a tenant as a primary resident."2 The im-
position of a resident tax filing requirement contradicts the
presumption against a change of domicile due to a failure to pay
taxes6 8
It is suggested that the initial inquiry as to primary residence
ought to be whether the tenant is, in fact, domiciled at the accom-
modation. At least two courts have used this approach.6 A domi-
' See The City Record, supra note 9.
Li In re Walter's Estate, 48 N.Y.S.2d 952, 956 (Sur. Ct. N.Y. County 1944) (failure to file
resident tax form merely indicates desire to escape taxation; it is of little value in the solu-
tion of questions of domicile); see also In re Estate of Brunner, 41 N.Y.2d 917, 918, 363
N.E.2d 346, 347, 394 N.Y.S.2d 621, 622 (1977) (despite decedent's statement to I.R.S.
that he considered New York his residence, a contrary statement was given to New York
State tax authorites and other factors revealed decedent's domicile was France).
" See 530 Second Ave. Co. v. Gold, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 12, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. App.
T. 1st Dep't 1985); Coronet Properties Co. v. Brychova, 122 Misc. 2d 212, 213-14, 469
N.Y.S.2d 911, 912 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), aff d, 126 Misc. 2d 946, 488
N.Y.S.2d 1020 (Sup. Ct. App. T. Ist Dep't 1984). In Gold, Justice Riccobono held that
despite the fact that the tenant lived in a rooming house while a full time law student,
anticipating graduation in May 1985, a finding of primary residence based on domicile was
not rebutted. See Gold, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 12, col. I (citing Melrose v. Green-
burger, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1984, at 6, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1984)). In Greenburger,
Justice Wright found primary residence without stating that the apartment was the tenant's
legal domicile. See Greenburger, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1984, at 6, tol. 5. The Greenburger court
concluded that no deprivation of primary residence status occurs simply because one's
spouse becomes an out-of-state student and lives elsewhere during the semester. See id. at 6,
col. 4. In dictum, Justice Wright stated that a wife could not be deprived of primary resi-
dence status if her husband took a job teaching at an out-of-state university or was drafted
into the armed forces. Id. at 6, cols. 5-6. Interestingly, the Greenburger decision involved a
conversion of the building with the landlord wishing to achieve a market price and the
tenant wishing to pay the insider's price for the apartment. See id. at 6, col. 4.
The Gold case, which found domicile, and the Greenburger case, which inferred domicile,
both recognize the following basic notions regarding domicile:
(1) students do not gain or lose a domicile by virtue of being away during studies, nor do
students for voting purposes gain or lose a residence while away from home. See N.Y.
CoNs'r. art. 2, § 4; N.Y. Et.v LAW § 5-104 (McKinney 1978); In re Davy, 281 App. Div.
137, 120 N.Y.S.2d 450 (3d Dep't 1952);
(2) entrance into military service does not change one's domicile to the place one is sta-
tioned. N.Y. ELEC. LAW § 5-104 (McKinney 1978); Small v. Small, 96 Misc. 2d 469, 473,
409 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381-82 (Sup. Ct. Schenectady County 1978); see also supra note 53
(entrance into armed forces is exception to 183 day residence requirement under the
amended regulations);
(3) the domicile of a married man or woman shall be established for all purposes without
regard to sex; a wife now has the same capacity to aquire a domicile of choice as does her
husband. N.Y. DoM. REL LAW § 61 (McKinney 1977 & Supp. 1986); Geiser v. Geiser, 102
Misc. 2d 862, 865, 424 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1980); Small, 96 Misc. 2d
at 473-74, 409 N.Y.S.2d at 381-82.
In Coronet Properties Co. v. Brychova, 122 Misc. 2d 212, 469 N.Y.S.2d 911 (N.Y.C.
Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1983), Justice Kramer held that "persons engaged in itinerant occu-
pations do not lose their domicile by virtue of their constant travel." Id. at 213-14, 469
175
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 1: 161, 1986
cile analysis requires a determination of whether the tenant lacks
an intention to leave at some future time; this intention is mea-
sured by the physical acts of the individual.6 5 Such a determin-
ation in every instance ensures that the civil and property rights,
taxability and descendency issues of tenants are not lightly or in-
advertantly disturbed. 6 Since one of the purposes of the primary
residence requirement is to ensure affordable rental housing ac-
commodations to actual residents," a failure to use the domicile
approach in the first instance could lead to the opposite result.68
Thus, if the tenant is domiciled at the accommodation, it is sub-
mitted that the apartment is his primary residence. While the ten-
ant's failure to file a New York City Resident Tax Return should
be a factor which suggests that the tenant is not a domiciliary, it
should not be determinative.69
N.Y.S.2d at 912. The court noted that the tenant's use of the apartment for her piano and
personal possessions, along with her intent to reoccupy the apartment when her profes-
sional life permitted, established domicile. Id. at 214, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 912.
s5 See supra notes 13-20 and accompanying text (domicile discussion). Actual residence in
a place may be primafacie evidence of domicile. See In re Will of Shindell, 60 App. Div. 2d
393, 395, 400 N.Y.S.2d 67, 69 (Ist Dep't 1977). Other physical acts and course of conduct,
however, also tend to prove the intent to make an accommodation one's domicile. See
Pignatelli v. Pignatelli, 169 Misc. 534, 537, 8 N.Y.S.2d 10, 13 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1938).
Circumstantial evidence which tends to show a domiciliary state of mind includes: the phys-
ical characteristics, location and disposition of property, the extent of care and expense
lavished on the property, and where the bulk of the household furnishings and clothing are
located. Note, Evidentiary Factors in the Determination of Domicil, 61 HARv. L. REV. 1232,
1235 (1948). Evidence of participation in community life such as voting, membership in
clubs and churches and the situs of economic interests may also be considered. Id. at 1236.
While informal declarations of domicile are given little weight, formal acts and declarations
such as the filing of tax returns, voting and automobile registrations are given varying
weight depending on whether the motivation or purpose for such acts was for a particular
limited time. See id. at 1237, 1239; cf. [19821 20 N.Y.C.R.R. § 102.2(e) (place of abode not
considered permanent if maintained only during temporary stay for accomplishment of
particular purpose).
'6 See In re Will of Webber, 187 Misc. 674, 677, 64 N.Y.S.2d 281, 285 (Sur. Ct. Kings
County 1946).
e' See supra notes 29-31, 37-43 and accompanying text (history and legislative intent of
primary residence requirement).
as See infra notes 70-90 and accompanying text (Quaranto and Schechter discussion). Any
difficulty in discerning whether an accommodation is a tenant's domicile is ameliorated
since the housing part of the civil court may use discovery where "ample need" is demon-
strated in summary judgment proceedings. Farkas, 121 Misc. 2d at 647, 468 N.Y.S.2d at
811; see also Saxon Assoc. v. Lenox Hill Hosp., 13 H.C.R. 257 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y.
County July 18, 1984) (legislature would not grant courts non-primary residence jurisdic-
tion without ability to use discovery).
*" See In re Will of Webber, 187 Misc. at 677, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 285; see also J. PRINCE,
supra note 19, at § 113 (burden of proof of a change in domicile rests upon party who
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With a two percent vacancy rate currently existing in New York
City,70 it is submitted that a clear use of the domicile analysis in all
cases would provide an appropriate restraint on unfounded non-
primary residence proceedings, many of which are solely moti-
vated by an impending conversion of the building or the desire of
the landlord to remove the apartment from regulatory status.
B. Court Applications
Despite the 1983 amendments to the New York City Rent and
Eviction Regulations and the RSA Code, several courts have rec-
ognized that the failure of a tenant to file a New York City Resi-
dent Income Tax Return is not dispositive when strict application
would produce inequitable results. 1 Instead, it is submitted that
these cases have recognized the inequities that would result if such
a filing were determinative. Furthermore, these cases could have
reached the same equitable result using a domicile analysis in the
first instance.
In Quaranto v. New York City Conciliation & Appeals Board," the
court rejected a strict application of the resident tax filing re-
quirement where a New York City tenant continued to file joint
tax returns from his marital address after he and his wife were
separated .7 The same marital address appeared on his automobile
registration and driver's license, allegedly to take advantage of
lower insurance rates available at that location. 74 Judge Kirschen-
baum, finding the continued use of the marital address reasonable
in these circumstances, held that the regulated apartment was the
tenant's primary residence .7  The Quaranto decision could also
alleges change).
70 See M. STEGMAN, supra note 3, at 93.
7- See Newport Apartments Co. v. Schechter, 124 Misc. 2d 760, 477 N.Y.S.2d 576
(N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1984), affd, 127 Misc. 2d 793,492 N.Y.S.2d 715 (Sup. Ct.
App. T. 2d Dep't 1984); Quaranto v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 12, 1983,
at II, col. 3 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
72 Quaranto v. Conciliation & Appeals Bd., N.Y.L.J., Oct. 12, 1983, at 11, col. 3 (Sup.
Ct. N.Y. County 1983).
73 Id.
71 Id. In Quaranto, the tenant introduced a physician's statement indicating that a heart
condition necessitated his move to New York City to avoid the daily commute from his
marital address in Syosset, Long Island. Id.
78 Id. The Quaranto court overturned a C.A.B. determination which had held that the
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have been decided using a domicile analysis since it is well settled
that a husband and wife have the capacity to acquire separate
domiciles of choice.7 6
In Newport Apartments Co. v. Schechter,77 the owner sought a de-
claratory judgment of non-primary residence and possession of a
rent stabilized apartment. 8 The Schechters had purchased a
home in Florida and spent five months of the year there. 9 Mr.
Schechter maintained a Florida driver's license and auto registra-
tion, and paid taxes in Florida.80 Mrs. Schechter, who accompa-
nied her husband on these trips, possessed a New York driver's
license, voted in New York in 1978, and had her will and various
contracts drawn in New York.8 1 After reviewing amended § 54 E
of the RSA Code, Judge Milano found that the Schechters did not
comply with this provision.8 2 Mr. Schechter, the tenant of rec-
ord,8 failed to file a New York City Resident Income Tax Re-
turn. 4 Mrs. Schechter did meet all the requirements; however,
she was not the tenant of record.85 Emphasizing their co-ten-
address used on income tax filings, a driver's license, and an automobile registration were
sufficient evidence of non-primary residence. Id. The court found that the landlord had
not sustained his burden of proof on the issue of non-primary residency since petitioner
had offered a rational explanation for the continued use of his marital address. See id. Fur-
thermore, the petitioner had submitted affidavits of five other tenants stating that they had
observed the petitioner entering and leaving the accommodation regularly for the last five
years. Id.
7" See Geiser v. Geiser, 102 Misc. 2d 863, 865, 424 N.Y.S.2d 852, 854 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1980); Small v. Small, 96 Misc. 2d 469, 473-74, 409 N.Y.S.2d 379, 381-82 (Sup.
Ct. Schenectady County 1978).
7 124 Misc. 2d 760, 477 N.Y.S.2d 576 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. Queens County 1984).
78 See id.
70 Id. at 762, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
t0 Id. at 762-63, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 578.
81 Id.
2 Id. at 763-64, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 579.
"3 Schechter, 124 Misc. 2d at 763-64, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 579. Generally, the primary resi-
dence inquiry is resolved by focusing on the tenant of record. See 520 E. 81st St. Assoc. v.
Welling, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 10, 1985, at 7, col. 5 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1985) (OHA
mandates that issue of primary residence be resolved by focusing on tenant of record and
not tenant's immediate family who occupy apartment); cf. Tagert v. 211 E. 70th St. Co., 63
N.Y.2d 818, 821, 472 N.E.2d 22, 24, 482 N.Y.S.2d 246, 248 (1984) (concurrent occupancy
by tenant and family members necessary). But see Wilkerson, supra note 3, at B3, col. 2
(proposed RSA Code will permit automatic lease renewal by spouses, children, parents,
step-children and step-parents; siblings and in-laws ineligible).
" See Schechter, 124 Misc. 2d at 764, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 579. The Schechter court stated that
Mr. Schechter met the 183 day residence requirement. Id.
8s See supra note 82 and accompanying text (primary residence determined by looking at
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ancy,88 Judge Milano found primary residence despite the tenant
of record's failure to file a New York City Resident Income Tax
Return.87 The court could have reached the same equitable result
using a domicile analysis whereunder neither the failure to file a
tax return 8 nor an absence due to poor health89 would defini-
tively indicate a change in domicile.
The Schechter and Quaranto decisions reflect a recognition of the
inequities that would result from adherence to a strict application
of the tax filing requirement. 90 It is submitted that these and
other cases would result in the same outcome had a domicile ap-
proach been used in the first instance, using the tax return as
mere evidence of intention.91 Under an outright domicile analysis,
the failure to file a resident tax return, or an address on a motor
vehicle registration or driver's license different from that of the
regulated apartment would, standing alone, be inconclusive if the
court were satisfied by other evidence that the tenant had the req-
the status of the tenant of record).
" Schechter, 124 Misc. 2d at 764-65, 477 N.Y.S.2d at 579. Judge Milano found Mrs.
Schechter a co-tenant, an "individual with all the rights and liabilities of that status devolv-
ing to her without any impediments because of her sex, gender or marital status." Id. Ac-
cording to the court, the eviction of Ruth Schechter would constitute a "travesty of jus-
tice." Id.
I7 d.
See In re Walter's Estate, 48 N.Y.S.2d at 954-56; In re Estate of Bourne, 181 Misc. at
238, 41 N.Y.S.2d at 336; see also Note, supra note 65 (failure to file tax returns may evince
intent, but is not dispositive).
s0 See In re Will of Lippert, 24 Misc. 2d at 82, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 548 (absence for health
reasons or climactic change does not automatically evince an intent to abandon one's
domicile).
" See supra notes 70-90 and accompanying text.
" See, e.g., Gold, N.Y.L.J., June 28, 1985, at 12, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. App. T. Ist Dep't 1985)
(tenant is domiciliary and filed resident tax return); Real America Co. v. Crow, N.Y.L.J.,
Apr. 9, 1984, at 12, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. App. T. 1st Dep't 1984) (purchase of home in Califor-
nia by corporate tenant who travels extensively not dispositive of intent to abandon); Green-
burger, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 1, 1984, at 6, cols. 4-6 (husband's name appearing on lease of out-of-
state student wife's residence does not deprive him of primary residence status); Brychova,
122 Misc. 2d at 213-14, 469 N.Y.S.2d at 912 (person engaged in itinerant occupation
maintains domicile). The nursing home cases could be similarly disposed of by an applica-
tion of domicile by operation of law which, in cases of incapacity or disability, attributes a
domicile to a person due to their inability to exercise an independent choice of domicile. In
re Will of Webber, 187 Misc. at 676, 64 N.Y.S.2d at 284; cf. In re Will of Lippert, 24 Misc.
2d at 82, 207 N.Y.S.2d at 548 (move to nursing home did not constitute change of domi-
cile); Heller, N.Y.L.J., Feb. 22, 1984, at 6, cols. 1-2 (confinement in nursing home leaving
personal possessions in apartment does not indicate abandonment).
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uisite intent to make the accommodation at issue a domicile.92
The amended regulations themselves, in part, recognize that no
one factor is determinative.93 It is submitted that courts in future
primary residence cases should initially use a domicile analysis to
determine the issue of primary residence; the tenant's failure to
file a New York City Resident Income Tax return should be mere
evidence of intent and not conclusive.
CONCLUSION
While prior administrative regulations are useful guidelines in
ascertaining the meaning of primary residence, the courts are not
bound by them. Such regulations should be employed by courts to
achieve results consistent with legislative intent, notions of justice,
and proper adjudication. Thus, in determining whether a tenant
is a primary resident, the first issue to be resolved is whether the
tenant was a domiciliary. If the tenant was domiciled at the ac-
commodation, the tenant will be a primary resident. If the tenant
is a non-domiciliary, then, as mandated in the regulations, the one
hundred eighty-three day test of physical presence may suffice as
an alternative measure of primary residence.
In neither event, however, should the failure to file a New York
City Resident Income Tax Return defeat a finding of primary res-
idence. The filing or failure to file a tax return should be mere
evidence in determining domicile so as to comport with domicile
jurisprudence. Moreover, this approach remains consistent with
the legislative intent underlying the enactment of primary resi-
dence requirements in rent-controlled and rent-stabilized housing
accommodations.
Louise G. Conway
92 See Note, supra note 65, at 1237. But see Kamvan Co. v. Rammel, 130 Misc. 2d 675,
675, 497 N.Y.S.2d 286, 287 (N.Y.C. Civ. Ct. N.Y. County 1985) ("Continued domicile is
not enough by itself to maintain primary residency."). It is submitted that continued domi-
cile should qualify the apartment as the tenant's primary residence.
13 See The City Record, supra note 9 (in making a determination of primary residence,
consideration may be given to any facts and circumstances establishing that accommodation
is not a primary residence including, but not limited to, address on tax return, etc.); see also
supra note 49 (cases under prior administrative regulations which appear to use a domicile
approach wherein all physical acts, facts and circumstances revealing the tenant's intention
are reviewed).
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